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PERIODS THAT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH TRIAL MUST COMMENCE

Sec.  3.  Exclusions.  -  The  following  periods  of  delay  shall  be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:
 
(a)   Any   period   of   delay   resulting   from   other   proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:
 
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;
 
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused;
 
(3)  Delay  resulting  from  extraordinary  remedies  against interlocutory orders;
 
(4)  Delay  resulting  from  pre-trial  proceedings;  provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;
 
(5)    Delay    resulting    from    orders    of    inhibition,    or proceedings   relating  to   change  of  venue  of  cases  or transfer from other courts;
 
(6)  Delay  resulting  from  a  finding  of  existence  of  a prejudicial question; and
 
(7)  Delay  reasonably  attributable  to  any  period,  not  to exceed  thirty  (30)  days,  during  which  any  proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
     
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.
 
    For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered  absent  when  his  whereabouts  are  unknown  or  his whereabouts  cannot  be  determined  by  due  diligence.  He  shall  be considered  unavailable  whenever  his  whereabouts  are  known  but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
 
    (c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of the accused to stand trial.
 
    (d)   If   the   information   is   dismissed   upon   motion   of   the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would  commence  to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
 
    (e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial  with  a  co-accused  over  whom  the  court  has  not  acquired jurisdiction,  or,  as  to  whom  the  time  for  trial  has  not  run  and  no motion for separate trial has been granted.
 
    (f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the  basis  of  its  findings  set  forth  in  the  order  that  the  ends  of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.

 

WHAT   ARE   THE   PERIODS   THAT   SHOULD   BE   EXCLUDED   IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH TRIAL MUST COMMENCE?

1.    Any  period  of  delay  resulting  from  other  proceedings  concerning the accused.

2.    Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

3.    Any  period  of  delay  resulting  from  the  mental  incompetence  or physical inability of the accused to stand trial.

4.    If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter  a  charge  is  filed  against  the  accused  for  the  same offense,  any  period  of  delay  from  the  date  the  charge  was
dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

5.    A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with  a  co-accused  over  whom  the  court  has  not  acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no
motion for separate trial has been granted.

6.    Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted  by any court  motu  proprio,  or  on  motion  of  either  the  accused  or  his counsel,  or the prosecution, if the court granted the  continuance
on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.

WHAT ARE EXAMPLES OF OTHER PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE ACCUSED WHICH SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE COMPUTATION OF TIME?

1.    Delay  resulting  from  an  examination  of  the  physical  and  mental condition of the accused;

2.    Delay  resulting  from  proceedings  with  respect  to  other  criminal charges against the accused;

3.    Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

4.    Delay  resulting  from  pre-trial  proceedings;  provided,  that  the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;

5.    Delay  resulting  from  orders  of  inhibition,  or  proceedings  relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

6.    Delay  resulting  from  a  finding  of  existence  of  a  prejudicial question; and

7.    Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement (careful consideration). 


PERIODS THAT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH TRIAL MUST COMMENCE

Sec.  3.  Exclusions.  -  The  following  periods  of  delay  shall  be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:
 
(a)   Any   period   of   delay   resulting   from   other   proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:
 
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;
 
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused;
 
(3)  Delay  resulting  from  extraordinary  remedies  against interlocutory orders;
 
(4)  Delay  resulting  from  pre-trial  proceedings;  provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;
 
(5)    Delay    resulting    from    orders    of    inhibition,    or proceedings   relating  to   change  of  venue  of  cases  or transfer from other courts;
 
(6)  Delay  resulting  from  a  finding  of  existence  of  a prejudicial question; and
 
(7)  Delay  reasonably  attributable  to  any  period,  not  to exceed  thirty  (30)  days,  during  which  any  proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
     
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.
 
    For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered  absent  when  his  whereabouts  are  unknown  or  his whereabouts  cannot  be  determined  by  due  diligence.  He  shall  be considered  unavailable  whenever  his  whereabouts  are  known  but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
 
    (c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of the accused to stand trial.
 
    (d)   If   the   information   is   dismissed   upon   motion   of   the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would  commence  to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
 
    (e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial  with  a  co-accused  over  whom  the  court  has  not  acquired jurisdiction,  or,  as  to  whom  the  time  for  trial  has  not  run  and  no motion for separate trial has been granted.
 
    (f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the  basis  of  its  findings  set  forth  in  the  order  that  the  ends  of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.

 

WHAT   ARE   THE   PERIODS   THAT   SHOULD   BE   EXCLUDED   IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH TRIAL MUST COMMENCE?

1.    Any  period  of  delay  resulting  from  other  proceedings  concerning the accused.

2.    Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

3.    Any  period  of  delay  resulting  from  the  mental  incompetence  or physical inability of the accused to stand trial.

4.    If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter  a  charge  is  filed  against  the  accused  for  the  same offense,  any  period  of  delay  from  the  date  the  charge  was
dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

5.    A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with  a  co-accused  over  whom  the  court  has  not  acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no
motion for separate trial has been granted.

6.    Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted  by any court  motu  proprio,  or  on  motion  of  either  the  accused  or  his counsel,  or the prosecution, if the court granted the  continuance
on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.

WHAT ARE EXAMPLES OF OTHER PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE ACCUSED WHICH SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE COMPUTATION OF TIME?

1.    Delay  resulting  from  an  examination  of  the  physical  and  mental condition of the accused;

2.    Delay  resulting  from  proceedings  with  respect  to  other  criminal charges against the accused;

3.    Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

4.    Delay  resulting  from  pre-trial  proceedings;  provided,  that  the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;

5.    Delay  resulting  from  orders  of  inhibition,  or  proceedings  relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

6.    Delay  resulting  from  a  finding  of  existence  of  a  prejudicial question; and

7.    Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement (careful consideration). 


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